TRUMP OR THE "TACO" SYNDROME

Donald Trump does not appreciate the nickname "taco" recently bestowed upon him by the English-language press, beginning notably with the influential Financial Times. It's not that the American president harbors any particular aversion to Mexican cuisine—and its famed corn tortillas garnished with guacamole and other exotic condiments—but rather the mocking implication behind this moniker, introduced by columnist Robert Armstrong, who holds considerable sway among investors.

In terms of tariffs, Armstrong asserts, "Trump always chickens out," succinctly abbreviated as "taco." In plain English: "Trump always backs down."

Consider this illustration: Trump frequently starts by threatening the entire planet—including polar penguins—brandishing staggering numbers: +30% for Canadians and Mexicans, +50% for Europeans, +145% for the Chinese, etc. However, once markets react (negatively), Trump withdraws, postpones, or drastically scales back his demands. Investors may thus rest assured: the "bully" is merely bluffing, creating much noise but ultimately backing down—though not without provoking global chaos and a significantly negative impact for the United States itself.

The taco syndrome similarly applies to Trump's foreign policy, according to a thorough study conducted by Jeremy Shapiro of the European Council on Foreign Relations. During his two terms, Trump rattled the saber of imminent military action no fewer than twenty-two times. Yet, on each occasion, he chose not to use force—except for two instances.

Who still recalls that Trump threatened North Korea with "fire and fury" unless it abandoned its nuclear weapons? Only to then engage in bizarre negotiations with Pyongyang's dictator, negotiations which, predictably, came to nothing. The same happened in Afghanistan, where Trump negotiated the withdrawal of American troops in Doha in February 2020, securing no concessions whatsoever from the Taliban. That agreement led directly, a year later, to Biden's disastrous retreat from Kabul in August 2021.

Certainly, Trump did order the elimination of Revolutionary Guard chief Qassem Soleimani and authorized two dozen airstrikes against jihadist targets—but always under circumstances where the United States faced no direct retaliation risk. Shapiro concludes Trump loves flexing muscles, noisily brandishing threats of force, playing tough in the media, but prudently avoids actual combat whenever a genuine risk of conflict emerges.

Four months after his return to the White House, lessons from his first term seem confirmed again.

Firstly, in Iran: having declared Iran must dismantle its entire nuclear program or suffer a massive strike, Trump is now negotiating a deal even less stringent than the 2015 JCPOA—which he himself denounced in 2018 as "horrible." To the chagrin of France, Europe, and Israel, Iran would retain the right to enrich uranium, even as Tehran relentlessly continues producing uranium enriched to 60% (450 kg, nearing weaponization). And what to think of the peculiar armistice negotiated with Yemen's Houthis, halting their attacks—but only against American ships?

The verdict is similar in Ukraine: Trump claimed he could establish peace within twenty-four hours; yet, peace seems increasingly distant every day. Frustrated by the "egos" of warring parties, he suggests he might leave the matter entirely to the Europeans. Trump dislikes war and has no intention of getting entangled in one.

As for Asia, at the recent Shangri-La Summit in Singapore, his Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, warned China against ambitions to conquer Taiwan. But given China's massive military buildup in the region—and America's economic threats toward Asia—U.S. credibility has significantly eroded. Countries in the region now find themselves trapped in a merciless vise: dependent on America for security, yet reliant on China for prosperity. In Singapore, Emmanuel Macron did attempt to present "Europe" as an alternative to confrontation between the two giants, but with limited success.

Thus, only the most vulnerable remain anxious: Greenland's Inuit, Panamanian shipowners… The "taco" syndrome might soon affect them as well. Unless, of course, Trump’s unpredictability leads him into yet another miscalculation.

Pierre Lellouche – Tribune VA – June 4, 2025