"THE TIME HAS COME FOR EUROPE TO REARM"

As a keen observer of international relations, Pierre Lellouche delves into the complexities of the war in Ukraine and its global impact in his book Engrenages – The War in Ukraine and the Shifting World Order. He critiques what he calls a reactionary "war of emotion" led by the West in response to Russia's aggression in February 2022, arguing for Europe to strengthen its intellectual, political, and military defenses in preparation for post-war challenges, not only within Europe but in a world already affected by the conflict.

A co-founder of IFRI (French Institute of International Relations), former deputy, minister, NATO Parliamentary Assembly president, and France's special representative to Afghanistan-Pakistan, Pierre Lellouche has dedicated much of his career to global affairs. Engrenages – The War in Ukraine and the Shifting World Order (Odile Jacob) is his latest work.
Interview with Pierre Lellouche conducted by Jean-Baptiste Noé

J.-B. N.: In Engrenages – The War in Ukraine and the Shifting World Order, you analyze the geopolitical dynamics of this conflict. You describe the war in Ukraine as a "secession." Why this term?

P. L.: This term is fitting when we consider the long history between these two Slavic peoples, marked by Ukraine’s 300-year integration into Imperial Russia and then the USSR, following 600 years of Polish and Lithuanian rule. Russia has never fully accepted Ukraine’s independence, even post-1991. Today, Ukraine is striving to definitively break from this historical subordination, especially since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. This conflict is a war of secession: Ukraine is trying to secure its independence with support from the U.S. and Europe, against a Russia bent on retaining influence. This clash arises from tensions unresolved since the end of the Cold War.

J.-B. N.: You often draw parallels between this conflict and the post-Treaty of Versailles era. Could you explain this historical comparison?

P. L.: The comparison is apt because the 1919 Treaty of Versailles left many geopolitical issues unresolved, as Jacques Bainville noted in Political Consequences of Peace. The Ukrainian question was ignored by both the victors and the defeated. In 1945, Stalin redrew Ukraine’s borders within the USSR, with Khrushchev adding Crimea to Ukraine in 1956 as a “gift.” The issue resurfaced in 1991, after the USSR's collapse: should Ukraine remain in Russia’s orbit, integrate into the West, or be neutral? Western powers, due to strategic neglect and economic interests, never addressed this question clearly, echoing geopolitical missteps of the 1930s. Today’s Ukrainian conflict reflects these mishandled tensions.

J.-B. N.: You’ve mentioned a "proxy war" between NATO and Russia. Could you clarify this concept?

P. L.: Since April 2022, the war in Ukraine has become an undeclared proxy war between NATO and Russia. After Russia’s failure at Kyiv and its retreat in March, the U.S., followed by European nations, escalated military aid to Ukraine. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated the goal was to weaken Russia’s military to prevent future aggression. This confrontation has intensified without a clear Western war objective, which weakens their strategy.

J.-B. N.: So the West lacks a clear war objective?

P. L.: Precisely. Unlike Russia, which has defined—even if evolving—goals, the West’s objectives remain vague. Initially, Russia likely aimed to occupy all of Ukraine and establish a pro-Russian regime, but this failed. Now, Russia focuses on securing the Donbas and Crimea. Russia’s objective is relatively clear today: maintain control over these areas. In contrast, the West’s stance boils down to a vague “as long as necessary” slogan, with no clear long-term strategy, leaving the war driven more by emotion than by a solid strategic plan.

J.-B. N.: In your book, you mention that the war in Ukraine has wider implications and signals a world in flux. Could you expand on this?

P. L.: The war in Ukraine represents a critical turning point, 30 years after the Cold War, for two main reasons. First, it impacts European security: the strategic status of the area between Germany and Russia will be central to future peace negotiations, likely starting next year. Secondly, this war has accelerated tectonic shifts already underway within international relations and power balances. Unintentionally, we’ve fostered a strategic alliance between China and Russia—a scenario Henry Kissinger dreaded. This alliance now includes two particularly destabilizing nations, Iran and North Korea, creating a bloc of four nuclear powers that I call the “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.”

We’re witnessing a reshaping of global alliances: on one side, the West, and on the other, a diverse but increasingly unified revisionist coalition of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, challenging the post-World War II order dominated by the U.S. and its allies. This revisionist bloc is supported by what Russia calls “the majority of the Global South”—emerging nations and regional powers no longer willing to submit to Western dominance. They’re striving to build an alternative order, with institutions like BRICS and financial systems outside the dollar framework. This shift marks a historic turning point.

J.-B. N.: You highlight the interconnection of the Ukraine war with other conflicts, particularly in the Middle East. Could you elaborate on this link?

P. L.: Yes, the Ukraine war has metastasized. There’s a clear connection between the Ukraine conflict and other hotspots, notably in the Middle East, where we see overlapping actors. For instance, Iran plays a significant role in both theaters: it supplies drones and weapons to Russia, which uses them against Ukraine, while also waging war on Israel, supported by powers like China that circumvent sanctions by buying Iranian oil.

These conflicts are intertwined through strategic, economic, and military alliances. North Korea, for example, supports Russia with arms and now troops, receiving protection from Moscow and Beijing in return. These dynamics illustrate how the Ukraine war has sparked a chain of repercussions in regions such as the Middle East, Asia, and even Africa, where American and French influence is now challenged.

J.-B. N.: In your view, what might a negotiated end to this conflict look like?

P. L.: A peace agreement is possible, but will it be solid and lasting? Or will we close the wound only to leave an infection inside? The general outline of a settlement was already discussed between the warring parties as early as April 2022, with Turkish mediation (I include the draft agreement in my book’s appendix).

The two sides will need to agree on territorial arrangements that neither Ukraine nor the West will recognize as final, just as we didn’t accept Germany’s partition as final in the 1940s. The reality is that Russia controls 20% of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea and much of the Donbas, which has effectively been annexed by Moscow. Ukraine is unlikely to reclaim these territories through military means. Thus, the future settlement will acknowledge this status quo.

The most challenging issues remain Ukraine’s status and security guarantees. Realistically, despite fine rhetoric, Ukraine will not join NATO; the U.S. and Germany are reluctant to cross that line due to fears of direct conflict with Russia. Ironically, this situation dates back to the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, where George W. Bush pushed for Ukraine’s immediate accession. Ukraine’s neutral status, compatible with EU membership, may be the solution, but it will require extremely robust international guarantees, especially as the U.S. shifts focus to Asia. Europe will have to play a crucial role in securing and rebuilding a post-war Ukraine: a devastated, politically unstable, and heavily militarized nation. The task ahead for Europe is monumental.

J.-B. N.: You seem pessimistic about Europe’s ability to meet this challenge. Why?

P. L.: I am indeed concerned by Europe’s lack of strategic vision and any meaningful post-war debate. European governments are fragile and poorly prepared for post-conflict challenges. Germany, France, and the U.K. are grappling with internal crises, especially economic ones. There’s little focus on stabilizing Central Europe, though it is essential for continental security.

This lack of leadership and vision is troubling, especially as the U.S. will likely pivot more towards its rivalry with China. Europe will need to take responsibility, but currently, I see few signs of readiness for this challenge.

J.-B. N.: What is the main message of your book?

P. L.: My book aims to highlight the geopolitical entanglements we’ve become caught in, without any strategic reflection. The war in Ukraine is more than a local conflict; it’s a historic turning point that’s reshaping the global order. The Secretary-General of the UN underscored this shift in his attendance at the BRICS summit in Kazan, hosted by Vladimir Putin, who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court.

If we fail to recognize the depth of these changes, we risk facing a more chaotic and violent world, unprepared. The time has come for Europe and the West to rearm intellectually, politically, and militarily to confront these new challenges.

Keywords: Europe, Ukraine War, Geopolitics, Russia, NATO