ISRAEL–IRAN: HOW FAR WILL THE WAR GO?

The idea had been debated in Israel for decades—at least thirty years: to destroy all of Iran’s nuclear facilities through airstrikes. Either carried out by Israel alone or with U.S. support. For a country whose population is mostly concentrated in a narrow strip of land—roughly the size of one or two French départements—living under the constant threat of annihilation from a single nuclear bomb launched by a regime fixated on the disappearance of Jews in the region was unthinkable.

The decision to strike during the night of Thursday to Friday was ultimately taken by Benjamin Netanyahu alone, prompted by four key factors:

• The state of Iran’s nuclear program, as confirmed just days earlier by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which estimated that over 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60% had already been produced at Iran’s two known sites—Fordow and Natanz. That amount could be used to make about ten nuclear bombs, each with the power of Hiroshima’s (15 kilotons). These fissile materials violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by Iran and are far beyond what’s needed for civilian purposes. Iran’s only nuclear power plant, at Bushehr—built by Russia—uses uranium enriched to just 3%.

• Iran’s weakening position, becoming a collateral victim of the very monster it had armed and supported for years: Hamas, under the Sinwar brothers. The trauma of the October 7 pogrom convinced Israel to methodically dismantle what it calls the “Iranian octopus” in the region—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis—leading to the fall of Assad’s pro-Iranian regime in Syria. Along with the collapse of its Shiite “resistance axis,” Iran also lost most of its air defense systems during Israeli bombings in October 2024. Its skies were left exposed.

• Political momentum for Netanyahu, who had just secured his parliamentary majority after a recent Knesset vote. The path was open for action, with the added benefit of redirecting global attention from Gaza to this new front.

• U.S. ambiguity: While the Trump administration remains committed to Israel’s defense, it now hesitates to get involved militarily. Trump favors negotiations over armed conflict. A round of talks had even been scheduled for Sunday, June 15, in Muscat, Oman—just 48 hours after Israel’s strike. By notifying only Trump, Netanyahu left him no room to react, effectively blocking any quick deal that might have let Iran keep its enrichment program. The surprise was total, and several senior Iranian officials were killed in the attack.

War is now underway, marked by daily, intense exchanges—Israeli air raids and Iranian retaliation through missiles and drones. But how far could this conflict go? Could it spread across the region—or even beyond?

As Clausewitz said: “The political objective is the goal, war is the means; a means without an objective is inconceivable.” If Israel’s goal is to completely eliminate Iran’s nuclear facilities, it may not be achievable in this war, despite the early success of its operations. Iran has learned from past threats and has deeply buried its most sensitive sites. Israel lacks the powerful bunker-busting weapons needed to reach them—unlike the U.S., which has 15-ton bombs designed for such targets. But Trump has ruled out direct U.S. involvement.

Another possible objective might be regime change in Iran, possibly triggering a popular uprising. But the regime of the ayatollahs is deeply entrenched, and the lack of a structured opposition makes this scenario unlikely.

So escalation appears to be the most probable outcome: with terrorism, a potential shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, and severe consequences for the global economy. Israel is expected to continue its airstrikes, while Iran will likely escalate attacks on Israeli civilians. Isolated on the diplomatic and military front, Israel will soon rely heavily on American military aid. Still, the Trump administration aims to avoid any direct engagement—unless its own forces are targeted.

In short, stalemate or escalation—the future of this war will depend on the immediate outcome of the strikes now underway.

Pierre Lellouche
June 15, 2025