The Post War of Iran: Lessons for France

The Israeli–Iranian war that began on October 7, 2023, in Gaza—now intersecting with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, now in its fourth year—confirms three major strategic lessons that France’s defense and security planners urgently need to consider. All three are sobering for the relevance of our current defense doctrine and capabilities.

First lesson: nuclear powers coexisting on a battlefield do not prevent war.

As I argued in my recent book Engrenages, even with four nuclear nations (the U.S., Russia, the U.K., and France) involved in Ukraine, that did not stop the worst war in Europe since 1945 or prevent nearly 1.4 million casualties combined. Likewise, in the Middle East, every country—including Iran—knows that Israel has had nuclear capabilities for years, yet this has not halted indirect warfare through Hezbollah and Hamas or the launch of hundreds of Iranian missiles into Israel since 2024.

In short, possessing nuclear weapons does not prevent war. That is an uncomfortable lesson for us, who have long believed in the reassuring doctrine of “pure deterrence”—the idea that any attack on France’s vital interests would be met with certain and immediate destruction. But such rhetoric is easily circumvented, as we have seen through hybrid warfare, terrorism, and even full-scale war.

Second lesson: the battlefield revolution brought by drones and medium-range missiles.

Ukraine revealed the tactical and strategic transformation caused by drone warfare. It also showed the pivotal role of ballistic missiles with ranges of 500–2,000 km—not just on front lines but against strategic and “soft” targets such as urban centers. Drones and missiles have replaced traditional artillery, enabling states to wage conventional war from hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away.

Soon, these weapons will appear across the Mediterranean, directly threatening France and Europe. Yet France and its European partners are just beginning their drone and ballistic programs—and, more alarmingly, they are essentially defenseless against air threats.

Thirty years of unilateral defense budget cuts and a belief that “war belongs to another time” have left us nearly without missile defense systems—and utterly divided on building a common European shield. Instead of collaborating on European-made tech, we are fragmented into two camps: France and Italy jointly back the SAMP/T Mamba program, while Germany leads the Sky Shield initiative, with about twenty countries aligned with it.

Both are multi-layered defense systems—covering short, medium, and exo-atmospheric ranges. France and Italy are developing European solutions (MBDA and Astrium) for exo-atmospheric threats. Meanwhile, Germany has already committed roughly €3.5 billion as of September 2023 to an Israeli-style exo-atmospheric system modeled on Iron Dome, the U.S. Patriot for medium range, and Germany’s IRIS-T for close defense. This split bodes poorly for other collaborative efforts in the pipeline, such as the future SCAF combat aircraft.

Third lesson: protecting civilian populations.

By June 18, Israel had been struck by approximately 400 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones targeting civilians—yet casualties totaled just 24 dead and 500 wounded. While this is partly due to the efficiency of their air defenses, it is also thanks to robust civil defense measures.

France’s so‑called “national resilience” strategy—a distant descendant of the 1930s Territorial Operational Defense doctrine—exists only on paper (rooted in a 1959 ordinance), not in practice. Unlike Israelis who build shelters in every home or apartment, or Finns, Swedes, and even Germans, France has chosen to abandon civilian protection in favor of “pure deterrence.” The bizarre assumption is that the more vulnerable we seem—leaving mothers with strollers exposed—the stronger the enemy will believe in our retaliatory resolve, thus preventing war.

Pierre Lellouche
June 19, 2025