Idées et analyses sur les dynamiques politiques et diplomatiques.
8 Août 2025
The question is threefold: will the unilateral decision by the President of the French Republic—declaring a sovereign Palestinian state last Wednesday—have any chance of contributing to a future peace agreement between Israel and its Palestinian neighbour? If not, will it at least reinforce France’s role and reputation on the international stage?
If the answer to those two preliminary questions is negative, why did Emmanuel Macron make such a decision, risking another diplomatic dead-end for France?
The response to the first question is obviously negative. Unilateral and unconditional recognition pleases Arabs, the Muslim world in general, Hamas (which congratulates us!), and doubtless the large Muslim community in France courted by Mélenchon and Villepin. But it convinces neither Trump’s America—which judges it “of no importance”—nor Germany and other democratic nations.
Macron himself had perfectly integrated a simple reason into his initial plan: recognition should follow—not precede—the achievement of three cardinal conditions: first, the eradication of Hamas’s bloody regime in Gaza and its complete demilitarization, together with the release of the remaining hostages; second, a comprehensive overhaul of the Palestinian Authority to render it capable of governing the future Palestine; third, mutual recognition by both Arabs (starting with Saudi Arabia) and Israelis.
That was Macron’s coherent initial project, before it was abruptly sidelined by the eruption of the Twelve‑Day War between Israel and Iran.
By no longer demanding anything from Hamas—whose charter clearly affirms that it is resolutely Islamist, not nationalist, and fights not for a Palestinian state but for the total destruction of Israel—Macron’s recognition becomes entirely inaudible in Israel, forever marked by 7 October.
Moreover, by no longer asking Arab states for reciprocal recognition of Israel, Macron’s initiative isolates Israel further, while undermining the permanence of the Abraham Accords. Those accords had begun a rapprochement process between Israel and Arab states without Palestinian preconditions—precisely why Hamas, armed by Iran, attacked on 7 October. Thus, Macron’s initiative ends up vindicating Hamas’s leaders a posteriori!
Israel is now accused from all sides of the worst crimes—genocide, of ceding to the Palestinian state. Only then—and perhaps only then—will Arab states intervene to recognize the Jewish state.
Such a stance may be seen as a symbolic gesture at a time when the world’s attention is fixed on famine in Gaza—provided one forgets that the Gaza population’s extreme suffering, its condition as “martyrs,” is deliberately cultivated by Hamas as a key element of its “victory” over Israel. Also forgotten is that for years Israeli towns were bombarded by missiles from Gaza and Lebanon—and later by hundreds of missiles from Iran against Israeli urban centres.
It is symbolic indeed—but in no way the first step in a thoughtful, serious French diplomatic effort toward the famed “two‑state solution.”
If this initiative has no chance of achieving peace in the Middle East, will it at least strengthen France’s role and voice on the world stage?
The answer, again, is hardly encouraging. Our European partners, our American ally, and many capitals of the Global South have fully grasped our country’s economic, financial, and even military weakness.
Expelled ignominiously from Africa, betrayed by our best allies in the Asia‑Pacific (AUKUS), openly scorned by Trump (“He’s a nice guy—but what he says doesn’t matter”), our country is being openly challenged by Algeria, which has been sending its criminals to us while holding our citizens hostage.
At best, Macron’s latest move will appear as yet another 180‑degree turn. Early in Ukraine’s war, Macron called for respecting Russia’s security interests, only later to denounce Russia as “an existential threat to France and Europe.”
The same pattern is at work in the Middle East: immediately after 7 October, Macron offered Netanyahu an international coalition against Hamas—even though the Israeli leader neither asked for nor needed it—before later demanding repeated ceasefires from Israel in its fight against Hezbollah and Hamas.
Had Macron been listened to, Hezbollah would still rule Lebanon, Assad would still rule Syria, and Tehran would remain the superpower of the region…
So why all the fuss around a move that everyone understands was doomed from the start?
To stop being accused of “double standards” by the Global South, as they sometimes say at the Quai d’Orsay? For moral reasons, certainly understandable in the face of famine in Gaza?
But then why remain silent on Sudan, Nagorno‑Karabakh, Kurdistan, or North Kivu, where massacres of civilians abound?
“No Jews, no news,” then? Or simply because this president—completely weakened and marginalized even in France—feels an irrepressible need to continue existing, to remain always in the spotlight?
His way of staying relevant, when he can no longer govern the country for lack of a parliamentary majority, is stacking trips across the world, summits, and media initiatives on nearly every subject.
Macron must be the saviour. Saviour of Greenland, the environment, Ukraine, and, incidentally, “Sovereign Europe” that he claims to lead—despite the extra trillion in debt he’s leaving France after eight years in power.
Now he is the saviour of the Palestinians. The French have learned what being “saved” by Emmanuel Macron cost them. Others will learn as well.