Questions About “Advanced” Deterrence

Two simultaneous wars, Ukraine and Iran; staging worthy of Kubrick or Coppola, with the presidential Falcon escorted by four Rafales en route to Île Longue, filmed above Mont-Saint-Michel; a presidential address delivered overlooking a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN): everything was in place, this Monday, March 2, for a historic speech on French nuclear deterrence.

In Paris, as in European chancelleries, this was all anyone had been talking about for weeks: France was going to extend its nuclear umbrella to its partners. An idea almost as old as the “force de frappe” itself, repeatedly put forward by Mr. Macron’s predecessors, but now taking on new urgency amid the current geopolitical turmoil.

In 1976, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and his chief of staff, General Méry, had already advanced the idea of “extended deterrence.” But at the time, Germany—seeing its only salvation in the American umbrella—rejected it, and the French proposal was shelved the following year, much to the satisfaction of the Gaullists, disciples of General Gallois (1911–2010), the father of the doctrine of “hard deterrence,” for whom “commitments to nuclear protection or extended deterrence are meaningless.” Since then, Paris has taken refuge in a carefully maintained ambiguity: our deterrence protects our “vital interests,” but these are not limited to the “national sanctuary” alone.

This time, however, between the French president’s irrepressible desire to present himself as Europe’s war leader and the near-panic of our European neighbors—fearful both of an aggressive Putin and of a Trump tempted by withdrawal—everyone was waiting to learn the precise adjustments Macron would make to France’s deterrence doctrine. Thus arrives “advanced deterrence.”

Skillfully, but also because he knew he was treading on politically risky ground, Macron immediately emphasized the limits of the exercise. France would propose extending its nuclear coverage to at least eight countries, but without sharing the essentials: “There will be no sharing of the ultimate decision, nor of its planning, nor of its implementation. Under our Constitution, it belongs solely to the President of the Republic, accountable to the French people.” “Consequently,” Macron added, “there will be no sharing of the definition of vital interests, nor any guarantee in the strict sense of the term.” That should address his political opponents, who were already accusing him of trading away national independence and sovereignty for Europe… Caution, then.

So where is the novelty? The answer: in the French president’s proposal to deploy, “on an occasional basis,” Rafale aircraft carrying nuclear weapons on allied European territories.

Thus, “our strategic air forces will be able to disperse across the depth of the European continent,” with the aim of “complicating our adversaries’ calculations.”

The question is whether this highly ambitious approach—extending France’s nuclear coverage over a large part of Europe—will be credible in Moscow, and tomorrow in Beijing, given our current arsenal of 290 warheads deployed on our four SSBNs and our Rafales. The beginning of an answer: the president announced an increase in the number of weapons and aircraft, as well as the construction of a fifth nuclear submarine planned within ten years… The problem: not a single euro mentioned to finance it all.

A second question, one that our future European “protégés” will inevitably ask: which French president would choose to risk turning Paris into glass to save Vilnius or Warsaw? A very old question, once posed by de Gaulle to the Americans—“New York for Paris?”—which he used as a pretext to withdraw from NATO’s integrated command in 1966, at the advent of the so-called “Flexible Response” doctrine. A doctrine of “tactical” nuclear war that sparked years of transatlantic debate, with proposals as baroque as the Multilateral Force (MLF), with its hypothetical submarines crewed by personnel from different nations, designed to share the ultimate nuclear decision…

No more than the Americans, despite their far more powerful umbrella, will France escape this debate. Meanwhile, Germany, drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine—where nuclear weapons have proven of no use—has chosen instead to embark on a massive program of conventional rearmament, to the tune of €500 billion.

Pierre Lellouche
03/04/26