30 Mai 2024
Two and a half years after its outbreak, is the war in Ukraine dragging Russians and Westerners towards a generalized war?
To understand this, it is important to keep in mind that, aside from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the war in Ukraine is the first instance since 1945 of a direct military confrontation, albeit by proxy, involving no less than four nuclear powers: Russia, and on the other side, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Between the two, there is a buffer state: Ukraine, at the heart of a continent bristling with nuclear weapons.
In Cuba, where the entire world trembled at the time, the crisis lasted only about a dozen days and was centered solely on a naval blockade. In the end, as we know, the crisis was resolved through secret negotiations and an equally secret agreement, where the Russians agreed to withdraw their medium-range nuclear missiles from Cuba in exchange for the withdrawal of American missiles deployed in Turkey.
In Ukraine, despite the violence and duration of the fighting, the war has been contained so far due to the well-known risk of uncontrolled escalation into total nuclear war. This has led both sides to observe two rules that have gradually taken hold: first, to avoid any direct confrontation between the forces of the two sides; second, to geographically confine the conflict to Ukrainian soil only, avoiding any spillover onto Russian or NATO territory.
The problem is that with the approach of summer, a year after the failure of the Ukrainian offensive in June 2023, and as the military situation on the ground is deteriorating severely for the Ukrainians, European allies, also panicked at the idea of a Trump victory in the White House which would question the very future of NATO, are considering getting much more involved in the conflict alongside the Ukrainians, risking breaking the two locks that have so far kept this conflict contained.
The first lock, explicitly stated by Joe Biden in February 2022, is the famous "No boots on the ground".
The United States will support Ukraine, including by sending arms, but will refrain from deploying any soldiers on Ukrainian soil. This, according to the American president's own words, "to avoid a third world war." This first lock was broken on February 26 by President Macron, by considering sending French and Western forces on the ground. Reiterated several times over the past three months, the French proposal is beginning to gain support from some particularly exposed countries, notably the Baltic states and Poland.
In contrast, the United States remains absolutely opposed, as do Germany, Italy, and other countries.
The debate is thus evolving towards the deployment, if not of combat forces, at least of "instructors" who would help train Ukrainian soldiers on-site, rather than at bases currently used in Germany and Poland, for example. But it is clear that as soon as NATO soldiers are in Ukraine, they risk being targeted by the Russians, leading to an obvious risk of escalation: what would we do in that case? And who would then control the escalation?
The second, implicit lock, which has allowed deterrence to be maintained for two and a half years, is that the war has remained confined to Ukrainian territory and has not spilled over into Russian or NATO territory. Specifically, the West has been able to deliver the equivalent of $200 billion worth of arms to Ukraine without the Russians trying to interrupt this flow at the Polish border, for example; but in return, their use has remained limited to Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. This rule, however, did not apply to the Ukrainians themselves, whose long-range weapons, notably drones, wreak havoc on Russian fleet ships in the Black Sea, as well as oil refineries located in Russia.
This second implicit rule is also breaking down these days. After the Russian offensive, launched on May 10 around Kharkiv, President Zelensky and his general staff have apparently convinced many Europeans and even the NATO Secretary General that Ukraine cannot continue to fight with "one hand tied behind its back": the Russians attack with impunity from their territory with missiles, guided bombs, and the Ukrainians are forbidden to respond to these launch sites. Hence the idea that this limit must be lifted, and as President Macron says, "we must allow the Ukrainians to neutralize the military sites from which missiles are fired at Ukraine."
We are therefore on the brink of a new phase, potentially extremely dangerous in the escalation of the conflict, which must be fully understood. Before it is too late, we must hope that the lessons of 1914 and the Cuban crisis have been carefully studied by those who govern us. The bottom line is that Ukraine, despite all its courage, cannot simply, for demographic and material reasons, reclaim all its territories occupied by Russia alone. That Zelensky is trying to internationalize the conflict and is fully playing the escalation card is perfectly logical from his point of view. But is it in the vital interest of France? Engaging in such a highly risky logic is certainly an option that must be considered, but one that should also be fully understood, and it deserves a true debate, before our people, who are the most directly concerned.
Engaging our soldiers in Ukraine is not like repeating the Barkhane operation (which has a sad memory, incidentally), whatever Mr. Macron says. Striking Russia with French missiles has necessarily significant political and strategic implications, which must be taken into account, and in that case, we must be ready to bear all the consequences.
For my part, I remain committed to a word that has never been uttered until now: the word negotiation. The goal of this war must be to prevent, not that Ukraine loses, but that it does not lose too much.
Pierre Lellouche
Le Figaro - MAY 29, 2024
EXCLUSIVE ENGLISH TRANSLATION FOR THE BLOG.
TRIBUNE - En se déclarant favorable à l’envoi de missiles sur le territoire russe, après avoir évoqué l’envoi de troupes occidentales au sol en Ukraine, le chef de l’État fait peser sur le continent un risque d’escalade, s’inquiète l’ancien ministre*.